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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

----------------------------------------In the matter of the Mental
Condition of

Case No. 15702

THOMAS WAHLQUIST.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
After a hearing held pursuant to U.C.A. 1953,
§64-7-36 on August 1, 1977, appellant was hospitalized
as a patient in the Weber County Mental Health Center
by order of Judge J. Duffy Palmer, Second Judical District Court for Weber County.

Upon appellant's petition

for re-examination of the order of hospitalization, a
hearing was held on February 21, 1978, at which time the
order of hospitalization was continued, and appellant
was transferred to the Utah State Hospital pursuant to
U.C.A. 1953, §64-7-41.

This appeal challenges the

procedures followed in the February 21, 1978, re-examination hearing.
DISPOSTION IN THE LOWER COURT
on August 1, 1977, appellant was found to be mentally
ill, in need of care and treatment, and because of his
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illness unable to carry through with a voluntary
treatment program, U.C.A. 1953, §64-7-36.

Con-

sequently, by order of Judge J. Duffy Palmer, Second
Judicial District Court, appellant was hospitalized
in the Weber County Mental Health Center.

That order

was continued after a hearing on February 21, 1978,
and appellant was transferred to the Utah State Hospital.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the order of
hospitalization and denial of appellant's request for
a new hearing to be held on his petition for re-examination of the order of hospitalization.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees generally with the statement of
facts presented by appellant.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.

2-4).
ARGUMENT
THE HEARING IN THE LOWER COURT WAS HELD
IN ACCORDANCE WITH STATUTORY STANDARDS,
AND APPELLANT WAS PROPERLY HOSPITALIZED
AT THE UTAH STATE HOSPITAL.
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As appellant states at page 5 of his brief, this
appeal centers upon a single issue - - the procedural
requirements of §64-7-45.

This section allows a patient

who has been committed to a mental health facility
pursuant to §64-7-36 to have periodic reviews of the
order of hospitalization, either upon his own petition
or that of a relative or friend.

The pertinent text

of §64-7-45 follows:
"Any patient hospitalized pursuant to
section 64-7-36 shall be entitled to a
re-examination of the order for hospitalization on the patient's own petition, or
that of the legal guardian, parent, spouse,
relative, or friend, to the district court
of the county in which the patient resides
or is detained.
Upon receipt of the petition,
the court shall conduct or cause to be conducted by a mental health commissioner proceedings in accordance with such section
64-7-36,. .
"
Appellant focuses on the word re-examination in the
first sentence of this statute,

(Appellant's Brief, p.

5), but disregards the substance of the rest of the
sentence.

The rules of statutory analysis, as cited by

appellant, require the court to presume that the words
and phrases
intent.

were chosen advisedly to express legislative

(Appellant's Brief, p. 5, citing Gord v. Salt

Lake City, 434 P.2d 499, 451 (Utah, 1967)).

However,

it certainly would not comport with either legislative
intent or rules of construction to analyze a statute
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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one word at a time, focusing on the general definition
of one word without regard for the position and function
of the word in the context of the sentence.

Indeed,'

the rule cited by appellant states that words and
phrases are chosen advisedly and must be given their
clear and everyday meaning.

"Phrase" refers to several

words which, when taken togethe4 express a single thought
or idea.

So in determining what re-examination means

in the context of §64-7-45, it might be helpful to
look at the complete sentence rather than the word
standing alone.
Respondent does not dispute that the word "reexamination" has the dictionary definition of "a second
or new examination".

(Appellant's Brief, p. 6).

But

in the context of §64-7-45, it is important to look at
the object of the re-examination.

It is the order, not

patient, which must be re-examined according to this statu
"Any patient hospitalized pursuant to section 64-7-36
shall be entitled to a re-examination of the order for
hospitalization • • •

II

u.c.A. §64-7-45.

Section 64-7-36(6) requires evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt that a proposed patient:
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(a) is mentally ill, and
(b) is dangerous to himself or others, or
(c) is in need of custodial care and treatment, and
because of his illness either
(i) lackssufficient insight to make responsible
decisions as to his need for care and treatment, or
(ii) lacks sufficient capacity to provide himself
with the basic necessities of life, and
(d) there is no less restrictive alternative to a
court order of hospitalization.
(See §64-7-36(6)).
Thus, the hearing held pursuant to §64-7-36 must be an
extensive evidentiary procedure, and it requires that the
mental condition of the proposed patient be thoroughly
examined by impartial, court-designated examiners.

On

the other hand, the purpose of a hearing pursuant to
§64-7-45 is to review and re-examine the order which
was made after an affirmative finding, beyond a reasonable
doubt, of all of the substantive elements of §64-7-36,
to determine that those conditions are still present and
the order remains valid.

The court must determine that

all of those conditions still exist, and that they have
not altered sufficiently to warrant the patient's
release.

Whereas designated examiners are necessary
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under §64-7-36 to facilitate the court's findings as to
the mental illness and the capabilities of a proposed
patient, they would not necessarily be required for
that same purpose in a re-examination hearing.

After a

period of time in treatment in the mental health system,
the patient's present condition and progress are best
known by those who have cared for and treated him during
that time.

Because the whole purpose of having a re-

examination hearing is to allow the court to evaluate
the progress of the patient and to determine if

he

should remain hospitalized, it is to the doctors who
have observed and participated in that progress that the
court should look for testimony in a re-examination hearir
It is therefore apparent that, contrary to appellant'
assertions, it is not a requirement under §64-7-45 that
the court even appoint designated examiners, especially
examiners who have had no prior contact with the patient.
The only basis that appellant has for claiming that
designated examiners must be appointed for a re-examinati'
hearing is the language in §64-7-45 which states that
upon receipt of a petition for re-examination the court

"shall conduct or cause to be conducted by a mental healt:
commissioner proceedings in accordance with such section
64-7-36, . . • • "

In other words, a re-examination heari~

must conform to the same procedural standards as the
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original commitment hearing must under §64-7-36.

However,

not every provision of §64-7-36 applies to a re-examination
hearing.
Section 64-7-45 outlines its own petitioning process,
so the provisions of §64-7-36(1) do not apply.

Most of

the provisions of §64-7-36(2) are applicable only to
prospective patients who are not currently hospitalized
or under the care of a mental health facility, and thus
have no relevance to §64-7-45.

Similarly, §64-7-36 (3)

can only logically be applied to the prospective patient,
not to one who, as appellant, is already in a hospital and
under the custody of the Division of Mental Health.
It is obvious, then, that appellant cannot argue that
all provisions of §64-7-36 must be applied in an identical
manner to a re-examination hearing under §64-7-45.
as sub-sections (1),

Just

(2), and (3) of §64-7-36 cannot be

applied to the re-examination procedure, neither can
sub-section (4), which discusses the appointment of
designated examiners.

In the original commitment process, the

court has had no experience with the patient, and must
appoint two examiners to facilitate the evidentiary
findings required by §64-7-36.

However, as previously

discussed, after at least six months in the custody of
a mental health institution, the best evidence as to

-7-
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the patient's present condition is going to come from
those who have treated him during his hospitalization
or confinement.

There is no longer any real purpose to

be served by court-appointed designated examiners.
just as sub-sections (1),

Thus,

(2), and (3) of §64-7-36 are not

incorporated in §64-7-45, neither is sub-section (4),
and designated examiners need not be appointed for a
re-examination hearing.
The phrase in §64-7-45 which states that

proceedin~

must be held in accordance with §64-7-36 undoubtedly
was intended to incorporate those provisions of section 36
which could logically and usefully be applied in a reexamination hearing.

For example, sub-section (5) of

§64-7-36 guarantees to mental patients the procedural
rights afforded to parties to criminal proceedings by the
United States Constitution.

Sub-section (5) sets forth

the basic procedures for a mental health hearing which
would be equally applicable to both initial commitment
hearings and re-examination hearings.

Likewise, the

substantive aspects of sub-section (6) are also
to a re-examination hearing.

applic~l

However, at least portions

of sub-sections (7) through (10), when read closely, can
only logically apply to the original commitment proceedir
for proposed patients, and cannot be utilized in a reexamination proceeding.

It is thus clear that when the
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legislature said in §64-7-45 that the proceeding should
be conducted in accordance with §64-7-36, it did not
mean that section 36 was to be incorporated part and
parcel into section 45.

One of the unincorporated

portions must be sub-section (4), because designated
examiners are unnecessary in a re-examination hearing.
Because the court was not required to appoint
designated examiners at all, there was no error in the
present case when Dr. Hansen and Dr. Schmidt were appointed
to testify in the present case.

Their testimony was

undoubtedly helpful to the court in determining that the
conditions which originally necessitated the appellant's
hospitalization (of which Dr. Hansen had particular
knowledge) still existed and that hospitalization was
still necessary (to which fact Dr. Schmidt was particularly
qualified to testify).

These two doctors were called

"designated examiners" because of the judge's apparent
assumption that because appellant requested designated
examiners, he had to appoint them, as he does in a
commitment proceeding under §64-7-36.

However, as has

been seen, there is no such requirement for a re-examination
hearing.

Nevertheless, the testimony of Dr. Hansen and of

Dr. Schmidt was certainly admissible in the February 21
hearing simply in their capacities as doctors who had knowledge of the appellant's condition, and there was no error
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in admitting their testimony.
Appellant's second point in his brief (p. 11) is
really only an extension of his first, and must fali on
the same basis.

Appellant argues that Dr. Hansen was

required to re-examine him, and because he did not do so
that the statutory process was violated.
fails in two ways.

That argument

First, it was not even necessary

that designated examiners be appointed, and thus

appell~

cannot base his argument on the duties of a designated
examiner because they are not applicable in a §64-7-45
hearing.

Second, §64-7-45 states that the order, not the

patient, must be re-examined, so appellant's lengthy
discussion regarding the meaning of "re-examination" is
not applicable to the patient and the condition of his
mental health.

Dr. Hansen was certainly competent to

testify as to appellant's condition when the original
hospitalization order was entered, and as the court had
to determine that appellant's condition had not changed
significantly, Dr. Hansen's testimony was relevant and
helpful.

Again, no error was committed by the trial court

in conducting the hearing under §64-7-45.
CONCLUSION
Appellant was hospitalized in August because his
mental condition required that he receive custodial care
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided
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and treatment.

As allowed by statute, appellant was

granted a hearing after six months in the mental health
system to determine whether he was still in need of such
care and treatment.

That hearing was conducted in

accordance with the requirements of §64-7-45, and the
appellant remains properly hospitalized at the Utah State
Hospital.
Respondent therefore requests that the order of the
lower court be affirmed.
Respectfully Submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
PAUL M. TINKER
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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This is to certify that I mailed two true and exact
copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent, postage
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84401, on this the 21st day June, 1978.
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